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Executive Summary
Transnational exchanges of plant, microbial and 
animal genetic resources are essential for scientific 
and agricultural research as well as for downstream 
commercial applications in many important 
fields, including food security and medicines.
Exports of in situ plant cultivars and microbial 
specimens discovered through bioprospecting 
require the permission of provider governments 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
of 1992, with specific regard to prior informed 
consent (PIC), mutually agreed terms (MAT) and 
access and benefit-sharing (ABS) agreements. Ex situ 
plant cultivars for both research and applications 
are available from seed banks governed by the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA, 2001), subject 
to benefit-sharing obligations imposed on 
commercial applications by standard material 
transfer agreements (SMTAs). Similarly, ex situ 
microbial specimens are made available for 
research and applications from public repositories 
governed by the World Federation for Culture 
Collections (WFCC) under SMTAs consistent 
with the CBD. In all cases, the use of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources 
requires the permission of relevant Indigenous 
populations, including PIC, MAT and ABS.
The Nagoya Protocol to the CBD (2010), entered into 
force in 2014, further requires all member countries 
to cooperate in cross-border enforcement of the 
CBD’s provisions. Under the protocol, end products 
based on or derived from genetic resources, 
including genomic sequence data, will become 
subject to seizure by national checkpoints unless 
they comply with the CBD. Compliance certificates 
will be made available for this purpose by a clearing 
house to be established under the protocol.
With specific regard to science policy, article 
4 of the Nagoya Protocol expressly validates 
multilateral regimes of facilitated access to 
ex situ genetic resources for both basic and 
applied research, subject to built-in “take-and-
pay” rules for commercial applications. The 
ITPGRFA was thus rendered legally consistent 
with the CBD by dint of the Nagoya Protocol.
The WFCC has developed SMTAs to cover its 
activities as “trusted intermediaries.” However, 
it should consider reorganizing itself as an 
international regime for facilitated exchanges of 
ex situ microbial materials, with a built-in take-
and-pay rule for commercial applications. Such a 
redesigned Microbial Research Commons should 
adopt a science-friendly governance structure that 
improves upon the scheme implemented by the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s 
(FAO’s) ITPGRFA, and it should also incorporate 
the World Data Centre for Microorganisms 
(WDCM), currently situated in China.
The Propertization of 
Plant, Microbial and 
Animal Genetic Resources
Transnational exchanges of plant, microbial 
and animal genetic resources, together with 
traditional knowledge concerning their uses 
by Indigenous communities, have always been 
essential components of human survival and 
economic stability.1 As Evanson Chege Kamau 
succinctly framed it, “No country is self-sufficient: 
all depend on crops and genetic diversity within 
these crops from other countries and regions.”2
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, bioprospectors could freely explore 
biodiversity-rich environments, often located in 
colonies governed by the economic powers of the 
day, in order to discover and isolate in situ genetic 
resources of potential interest to their respective 
1 See e.g. Kevin McCluskey et al, “The U.S. Culture Collection Network 
Responding to the Requirements of the Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit Sharing” (2017) 8:4 mBio 1 (stating that “access to living 
resources has been foundational to research, health care, agriculture, 
and industry since the beginning of modern biology” at 2); Christine 
Godt, “Networks of ex situ collections of genetic resources” in Evanson 
Chege Kamau & Gerd Winter, eds, Common Pools of Genetic Resources: 
Equity and Innovation in International Biodiversity Law (London, UK: 
Routledge, 2013), 246 [Common Pools of Genetic Resources]. See 
also National Research Council, A New Biology for the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2009), emphasizing the 
fundamental importance of microbiology in a New Biology paradigm.
2 Evanson Chege Kamau, “The multilateral system of the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: lessons and 
room for further development” in Common Pools of Genetic Resources, 
supra note 1 at 343, n 1. 
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scientific, agricultural or industrial endeavours.3 
Once scientifically validated, particularly important 
exemplars of these in situ genetic resources were 
often deposited in ex situ public repositories, such 
as the agricultural seed banks managed by the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR)4 and — for microbial specimens 
— the WFCC.5 Operating as basic components 
of the global scientific infrastructure, these 
repositories provided both public and private users 
with ex situ genetic resources, normally (but not 
uniformly) at the marginal cost of distribution, 
as befitted their status as global public goods.6
The once-customary view that genetic resources, 
together with associated traditional knowledge, 
constituted the “common heritage of mankind”7 
was first directly challenged in 1962, when the 
United Nations adopted a declaration on the 
sovereignty of states over natural resources.8 By the 
3 See generally Jerome H Reichman, Paul F Uhlir & Tom Dedeurwaerdere, 
Governing Digitally Integrated Genetic Resources, Data, and Literature: 
Global Intellectual Property Strategies for a Redesigned Microbial 
Research Commons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) ch 2,  
s 1 (“Historical Importance of Genetic Resources as Global Public Goods”).
4 CGIAR, “Crop Genebank Knowledge Base”, online: <http://cropgenebank.
sgrp.cgiar.org>. See e.g. Michael Halewood, “Governing the management 
and use of pooled microbial genetic resources: Lessons from the global crop 
commons” (2010) 4:1 Intl J Commons 404. See generally Reichman, Uhlir & 
Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 46–50, 112–15, 121–30 (explaining the 
role of the CGIAR under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) of 2001).
5 WFCC, “About WFCC”, online: <www.wfcc.info/about/>. See e.g. 
David Smith, Dagmar Fritze & Erko Stackebrandt, “Public Service 
Collections and Biological Resource Centers of Microorganisms” in 
Eugene Rosenberg et al, eds, The Prokaryotes: Prokaryotic Biology and 
Symbionic Associations (Berlin: Springer, 2013) 267.
6 See generally Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 2 at 
37–82 (“Between Private and Public Goods: Emergence of the Transnational 
Research Commons for Plant and Microbial Genetic Resources”). One of 
the world’s major suppliers of ex situ genetic resources, the American Type 
Culture Collection (ATCC), has operated on a commercial basis since losing US 
government funding in the 1960s. See ATCC, “About ATCC” [ATCC], online: 
<www.atcc.org/en/About/About_ATCC.aspx>. 
7 See International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, UNFAO Res 
8/83, 22nd Sess (5–23 November 1983). See also Reichman, Uhlir & 
Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 50–52 (“Short-Lived Recognition of 
Plant Genetic Resources as the Common Heritage of Mankind”).
8 See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, GA Res 1803 
(XVII), UNGAOR UN Doc A/RES/1803 (1962) [1962 Declaration]. 
For a skeptical view of claims to ex situ genetic resources, based on a 
misunderstood interpretation of the “common heritage” principle, see 
Jonathan Curci, The Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge 
in International Law of Intellectual Property (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) at 9. See also Graham Dutfield, Intellectual 
Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, 2nd ed 
(Abingdon, UK: Earthscan, 2004) at 5–6. For the demise of the common 
heritage principle and its implications, for plant genetic resources in 
particular, see Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 2, 
ss I.B, III.A.
1990s, when the most-developed countries were 
demanding universal respect for patented microbes 
and plant breeders’ rights under what eventually 
became the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 
of 1994,9 the developing countries struck back with 
“biopiracy” claims of their own. Specifically, they 
argued that the downstream innovations protected 
by intellectual property (IP) rights in the Global 
North were often based on genetic resources taken 
from the biodiversity-rich countries, along with 
associated traditional knowledge of Indigenous 
populations. From this perspective, unauthorized 
use of these same genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge, even for public research purposes, 
constituted an illegal encroachment on their 
territorial sovereignty.10 In 1992, that thesis became 
firmly established in the CBD, now signed by some 
190 countries.11 The United States is also a signatory, 
but Congress has never ratified this treaty.12
The professed goal of harmonized IP rights under 
the TRIPS Agreement was to stimulate higher 
levels of investment in innovation generally. This 
initiative responded to opportunities generated by 
an increasingly integrated global marketplace, in 
which commercial transfers of technology could 
occur without territorial governments imposing 
9 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,  
15 April 1994, 108 Stat 4809, 1869 UNTS 299 art 27 [TRIPS 
Agreement]; International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, 2 December 1961, 33 UST 2703, 815 UNTS 89 
(as subsequently amended) 1978 and 1991. See e.g. Julianna Santilli, 
Agrobiodiversity and the Law: Regulating Genetic Resources, Food 
Security and Cultural Diversity (Abingdon, UK: Earthscan, 2012). Plant 
variety protection systems covered new plant varieties that are distinct, 
uniform and stable for a limited period of time, initially on a copyright-
like model, eventually on a patent-like model. See JH Reichman, “Legal 
Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms” (1994) 94 Colum L 
Rev 2432 at 2465–72.
10 See e.g. Burton Ong, “Harnessing the Biological Bounty of Nature: 
Mapping the Wilderness of Legal, Socio-Cultural, Geo-Political and 
Environmental Issues” in Burton Ong, ed, Intellectual Property and 
Biological Resources: Perspectives on contemporary issues (Singapore: 
Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004) at 1, 3–4, 18. See also Sarah A 
Laird, ed, Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships 
in Practice (London, UK: Earthscan: 2002).
11 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79,  
31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993) [CBD], online: <www.
cbd.int/convention/text>.
12 US Department of State, “Treaties Pending in the Senate (updated as of 
May 8, 2017)”, online: <www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/>. 
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protectionist trade barriers.13 The professed aim 
of the CBD was to support the conservation of 
genetic resources by provider countries, especially 
the developing countries, and to reward their 
Indigenous populations whose traditional 
knowledge may have informed commercial 
applications of those same genetic resources.14
In effect, the CBD imposed territorial sovereignty 
on all genetic resources, as well as related 
traditional knowledge, and it conditioned the 
rights of anyone — including research scientists 
— to remove or otherwise use such resources 
on the permission of the relevant government 
authorities.15 Key implementing provisions are 
found in articles 15 and 16. Article 15(2) establishes 
the authority of national governments to regulate 
access to genetic resources under domestic 
legislation.16 Access, where granted, shall be on 
terms that are mutually agreed,17 subject to PIC,18 
with fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from research and development.19 Traditional 
knowledge of Indigenous communities is expressly 
included within these same ABS obligations.20
In principle, developing-country providers of genetic 
resources should also obtain access to — and 
transfer of — technology that makes use of their 
genetic resources, “including technology protected 
by patents and other intellectual property rights, 
on mutually agreed terms.”21 Also included in this 
scheme are permissions for publications or transfers 
of genetic information based on relevant genetic 
13 See e.g. Keith E Maskus, Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global 
Economics of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century, 2nd ed (Washington, 
DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012); Peter K Yu, “The 
International Enclosure Movement” (2007) 82 Ind LJ 827; JH Reichman, 
“Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under 
the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement” (1998) 29 Intl Lawyer 345, 
online: <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/687>.
14 See e.g. Evanson C Kamau & Gerd Winter, eds, Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge & the Law: Solutions for Access & Benefit 
Sharing (London, UK: Earthscan, 2009); Regine Andersen, Governing 
Agrobiodiversity: Plant Genetics and Developing Countries (Farnham, 
UK: Ashgate, 2008); Charles McManis, ed, Biodiversity & the Law: 
Intellectual Property, Biotechnology & Traditional Knowledge (London, 
UK: Earthscan, 2007); Dutfield, supra note 8.
15 See CBD, supra note 11, arts 2, 8, 15–16, 19–20.
16 Ibid, art 15(2).
17 Ibid, art 15(4).
18 Ibid, art 15(5).
19 Ibid, art 15(7).
20 Ibid, art 8(j).
21 Ibid, art 16(3).
resources and the duty to share benefits from 
commercial uses of ex situ specimen collections.22 
A multilateral benefit-sharing fund should also be 
established by the COP for purposes of managing 
both mandatory and voluntary contributions.23
Taken together, these provisions of the CBD 
established the premises for an international regime 
of misappropriation with respect to unauthorized 
uses of genetic resources — plant, microbial, animal 
— and all related traditional knowledge originating 
from the territories of nation-states adhering to the 
CBD.24 Under what may be deemed the “bilateral 
approach,” research scientists in Occitania who 
want to study plant or microbial genetic resources 
originating from Ruritania must negotiate first with 
the Ruritanian government (PIC); sign an agreement 
with the designated national authority; obtain 
legitimate access to the specimens; and agree to 
the conditions under which any commercial gains 
from the research results will be shared with the 
provider country (“on fair and equitable terms”).25
However, as reasonable as these arrangements 
may sound, they are in practice onerous and 
often unworkable from the scientific researchers’ 
perspective. In the first place, provider countries 
have been slow to enact implementing legislation, 
and, once enacted, these laws tend to be diverse 
and complicated, and often full of both legal 
and practical uncertainties.26 Second, there is no 
consensus regarding ABS obligations applicable to 
genetic resources acquired before 1993, when the 
22 See e.g. Tomme Young et al, “Analysis of Claims of ‘Unauthorized Access 
and Misappropriation of Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional 
Knowledge’” in Tomme Young, ed, Governing ABS: Addressing the 
Need for Sectoral, Geographical, Legal, and International Integration 
in the ABS Regime (Gland, Switzerland: International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources [IUCN], 2009) 97 at 117. 
See also Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 91–99.
23 See CBD, supra note 11, arts 20–21. 
24 See e.g. Young et al, supra note 22 at 98–116.
25 See also Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 91–96 
(citing authorities).
26 See e.g. Margo A Bagley & Arti K Rai, The Nagoya Protocol and 
Synthetic Biology: A Look at the Potential Impacts (Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2013) at 16–17, 
online: <www.synbioproject.org/site/assets/files/1276/nagoya_final.
pdf>. See also Darrell A Posey & Graham Dutfield, Beyond Intellectual 
Property: Toward Traditional Resource Rights for Indigenous Peoples 
and Global Communities (Ottawa: International Development Research 
Centre, 1996) at 147–53 (stressing the need for overseas collectors to 
fulfill conditions acceptable to local providers of biological resources 
before access is granted, as well as the rights of local communities to veto 
commercial applications and to share the benefits when they agree to 
commercialization).
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CBD took effect.27 This same problem resurfaced 
with the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol to 
the CBD in 2010,28 as discussed below.29
Still another complicating factor is that some 
countries, such as Canada and the United 
States, are both providers and users of genetic 
resources covered by the CBD.30 Moreover, 
even a country that does not typically 
provide in situ genetic resources or related 
traditional knowledge may nonetheless be 
the place where major providers of ex situ 
genetic resources are located, as occurs 
with the ATCC in the United States.31
Disregarding these and other technical legal 
issues, the ex ante negotiations obligatory under 
the CBD are ill-suited to the needs of early-stage 
scientific research, for the following reasons.
 → They entail very high transaction costs and other 
technical and administrative barriers to research.
 → In situ resources are intrinsically of 
uncertain value until later scientific 
work is done to validate them and 
evaluate potential applications.
 → National authorities in developing countries 
tend to cling to their in situ genetic resources 
and thereby impose very restrictive conditions 
that sometimes make it difficult for their 
own scientists, let alone foreign researchers, 
27 See e.g. Bagley & Rai, supra note 26 at 17–20; see further Thomas 
Greiber et al, An Explanatory Guide to the Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-sharing (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No 83) 
(Gland, Switzerland & Bonn, Germany: IUCN & IUCN Environmental 
Law Centre, 2012) at 72–73.
28 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the 
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 October 2010 (Montreal: 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011) (entered into 
force 12 October 2014) [Nagoya Protocol], online: <www.cbd.int/abs/
doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf>. See also Report of the Sixth 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, The Hague, 7–19 April 2002, UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 
(27 May 2002) at Annex 2, online: <www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/
cop-06/official/cop-06-20-en.pdf>; Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilization (Montreal: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2002), online: <www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf>.
29 See below notes 59–82 and accompanying text.
30 See e.g. Chidi Oguamanam, “Genetic Resources & Access and Benefit 
Sharing: Policies, Prospects and Opportunities for Canada after Nagoya” 
(2011) 22:2 J Envtl L & Prac 87 at 108–11; see also ATCC, supra note 6.
31 See ATCC, supra note 6. See further Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, 
supra note 3, ch 4 (“The Existing Microbial Research Commons Confronts 
Proprietary Obstacles”).
to obtain in situ (or even ex situ) specimens 
from seed banks or culture collections.32
In short, under the bilateral or case-by-case 
approach, each party tends to overvalue or 
undervalue the potential worth of any given 
specimen, before value-adding research has been 
undertaken. This tendency impedes research and 
threatens to limit not only research outputs but 
also the development of medicines and agricultural 
or other end products in the first place, resulting 
in fewer benefits to share for everybody.33
Faced with these obstacles, scientists depend 
increasingly on access to ex situ plant and microbial 
genetic resources made available from agricultural 
seed banks and microbial culture collections 
around the world,34 as well as on deposits of 
genomic data in publicly available repositories.35 
Once identified and validated by experts, these 
ex situ genetic resources are made freely available 
for public and private research under SMTAs 
that typically attempt to distinguish between 
commercial and non-commercial research.36
From an international legal perspective, however, 
a big question left on the table after 1993 was 
whether these time-honoured scientific research 
practices remained valid under the CBD. In other 
words, were the ex situ public seed banks and 
microbial culture collections legally operational 
under the CBD after 1992 — or were they persistent 
violators that distributed misappropriated genetic 
materials in violation of international law?
32 Cf Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, at 100–106  
(“The Threat to Public Scientific Research on Plant and Microbial  
Genetic Resources”).
33 See ibid at 106–10 (“Major Weaknesses of the ‘Bilateral Approach’”), 
250–56. 
34 See ibid at 111–18; see also Sarah A Laird & Rachel P Wynberg  
(with contributions from Arash Iranzadeh & Anna Sliva Kooser),  
“The Emergence and Growth of Digital Sequence Information in Research 
and Development: Implications for the Conservation and Sustainable Use 
of Biodiversity, and Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing” (9 November 2017) 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity Fact-Finding and 
Scoping Study, online: <www.researchgate.net/publication/321005788_
The_Emergence_and_Growth_of_Digital_Sequence_Information_in_
Research_and_Development_Implications_for_the_conservation_and_
sustainable_use_of_biodiversity_and_fair_and_equitable_benefit_sharing>. 
35 See Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 8 (“Fully 
Exploiting Data-Intensive Research Opportunities in the Networked 
Environment”). 
36 Ibid, ch 4 at 170–98 (citing authorities). But see ibid, ch 4 at 199–209  
(“Contractual Restrictions on Access to and Use of Upstream Microbial 
Genetic Resources in Both Developed and Developing Countries”),   
210–30 (“The Research Community Pushes Back”).
5Why the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD Matters to Science and Industry in Canada and the United States
The Legal Status of Ex 
Situ Plant and Microbial 
Transactions after the 
Nagoya Protocol (2010) 
The primary value of public seed banks and 
microbial culture collections is to serve as inputs 
to basic research, with unknown outcomes, 
including eventual commercial applications.37 
Nevertheless, it was clear from the outset that 
public scientific repositories would have to 
comply with the CBD,38 given that the CBD 
itself failed to acknowledge the importance of 
exempting basic scientific infrastructure. The 
task of conforming the operations of these ex situ 
collections to the ABS obligations of the CBD was, 
however, greatly complicated by the failure of 
the CBD to specify how its multilateral regime of 
misappropriation was to be enforced in practice.
The immediate result of this tension and 
uncertainty was a crisis for the agricultural and 
microbiological research communities with 
regard to access to both ex situ plant and microbial 
genetic resources. The very legality of the public 
seed banks, indispensable for agricultural science, 
and of the culture collections, indispensable for 
microbiology, was called into question, while the 
CGIAR was reportedly on the verge of collapse.39
In the late 1990s, the FAO responded to this 
emergency by sponsoring an international 
37 See e.g. David Smith, “Culture Collections” (2012) 79 Advances in 
Applied Microbiology 73 at 75–76; Cletus Kurtzman, “The Agricultural 
Research Service Culture Collection: Germplasm Accessions and 
Research Programs” in Paul F Uhlir, ed, Designing the Microbial Research 
Commons: Proceedings of an International Symposium (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2011) 55; Derek Byerlee & HJ Dubin, “Crop 
Improvement in the CGIAR as a Global Success Story of Open Access and 
International Collaboration” (2010) 4:1 Intl J Commons 452 at 456–57.
38 See e.g. WFCC, “Information Document on Access to ex-situ Microbial 
Genetic Resources within the Framework of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity” (1996) (background document submitted to the UNEP/
PBD/COP/3/Inf.19), online: <www.wfcc.info/index.php/wfcc_library/
genetic_res/>; see also EC, Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on compliance measures for 
users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union 
(text with EEA relevance), [2014] OJ, L 150/59 [EU Regulation 511/2014].
39 Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 3 at 111–17 
(“Destabilizing the Exchange of Plant and Microbial Genetic Resources  
as Global Public Goods”).
treaty to rescue and legitimatize the CGIAR’s 
public seed banks for plant cultivars. A primary 
objective was to legally establish the seed banks 
as an international entity operating under the 
auspices of a multilateral treaty of facilitated 
access that would authorize them to continue 
exchanging ex situ plant cultivars for research 
and breeding purposes. This project gave rise 
to the ITPGRFA of 2001,40 which for the sake of 
convenience we may call the “crop commons.”41
The ITPGRFA, which is administered by the 
FAO, promotes the conservation of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture and 
the equitable sharing of benefits from the use 
thereof for sustainable agriculture and food 
security.42 In so doing, the treaty also established 
a built-in benefit-sharing regime for users of ex 
situ plant cultivars accessed from the CGIAR’s 
seed banks.43 Under this regime, would-be 
commercial users were subject to a liability 
rule, that is, a take-and-pay rule, embodied in 
the treaty and enforced by SMTAs. Commercial 
plant breeders who wished to take cultivars from 
the crop commons were required in principle 
to pay a small royalty on sales of downstream 
applications to the benefit-sharing fund of the 
multilateral system, but they were not obliged to 
negotiate directly with provider governments.44 
Moreover, the ITPGRFA forbids users to take 
IP rights on ex situ plant cultivars in the form 
40 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
3 November 2001, 2400 UNTS 303 (entered into force 29 June 2004) 
[ITPGRFA].
41 See e.g. Laurence R Helfer, “Comment II: Using Intellectual Property 
Rights to Preserve the Global Genetic Commons: The International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture” in Keith 
E Maskus & Jerome H Reichman, eds, International Public Goods and 
Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 217 at 217–19.
42 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, arts 5–6. For specific crops covered so far,  
see Annex I.
43 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, arts 10–15. The treaty also envisioned that 
in situ plant genetic resources residing in the public domain of provider 
countries would also be placed under the multilateral regime, but these 
provisions have so far not been implemented. See ibid, arts 4, 7. For 
further details about ITPGRFA see Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, 
supra note 3 at 119–130. For the SMTAs, see ibid, ch 3 at 125–29. 
44 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, arts 10–15. See further Daniele Manzella, 
“The design and mechanics of the multilateral system of access and 
benefit sharing” in Michael Halewood, Isabel López Noriega & Selim 
Louafi, eds, Crop Genetic Resources as a Global Commons: Challenges 
in International Law and Governance (Abingdon, UK: Earthscan, 2013), 
150 at 156 [Crop Genetic Resources]; Santilli, supra note 9 at 143. 
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received from the multilateral system.45 Users can, 
however, protect downstream applications of plant 
cultivars received from the system, subject to the 
payment of a small royalty to the benefit-sharing 
fund from sales of end products. The Governing 
Body (composed of member governments) was 
established to manage this international regime, 
and the FAO itself volunteered to enforce its 
SMTAs and related decisions when needed.46
However, the strengths of the ITPGRFA were partly 
offset by a number of weaknesses.47 For example, 
the take-and-pay rule could be waived if the 
commercial users agreed to allow a broad research 
exemption for further uses of any new plant 
varieties subsequently developed and protected 
either by patents or plant breeders’ rights.48 But 
why should commercial users of genetic resources 
be allowed to waive benefit-sharing royalties when 
the whole purpose of a multilateral regime was to 
support research and applications? One would have 
expected a multilateral regime to provide both a 
research exemption for science and a reasonable 
royalty under the take-and-pay regime to support 
the costs of the multilateral system, if nothing else.
Furthermore, the ITPGRFA expressly disavowed 
any tracking requirements for plant cultivars 
(unlike the public microbial culture collections).49 
Still another notable defect is that the Governing 
Body consists entirely of government appointees, 
with little voice and no voting rights for the 
relevant scientific and Indigenous communities.50 
Notwithstanding these and other flaws in the 
design of the ITPGRFA, administrators of the crop 
commons have been remarkably successful in 
managing and further developing the multilateral 
regime for facilitated access to plant genetic 
resources. A major turning point occurred in 
2006 when agreements between the Governing 
45 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, art 12.3(b)(e). 
46 Ibid, arts 10–15; Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 
119–130 (citing authorities); 496–504 for analysis of the Governing 
Body.
47 Compare Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 131–35 
(“Demonstrable Achievements”) with 135–42 (“Major Weaknesses”).
48 See FAO Conference, Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, “Standard Material Transfer Agreement” (2006), at para 
6(8) [FAO Conference], online: <www.fao.org/3/a-bc083e.pdf>.
49 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, art 13(3). However, a general notification of use 
must be sent to the Governing Body.
50 See further Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 496–99 
(“A Two-Headed Governance Construct”).
Body and the CGIAR’s international agricultural 
research centres (IARCs)51 reaffirmed the status 
of ex situ collections held by the centres as 
“global public goods” and formally placed their 
seed banks under the auspices of the treaty.52 
Thus shielded politically, the seed banks have 
been distributing about 600 plant cultivars per 
day to researchers and commercial breeders in 
both developed and developing countries under 
SMTAs approved by the Governing Body.53 
There has also been an increase of materials 
sent to the centres by developing countries 
after a decade of decline, and some important 
agricultural research institutes not affiliated 
with the CGIAR have also joined the system.54 
Voluntary contributions to the benefit-sharing 
fund have also flowed in, enabling the Secretariat 
to fund numerous training courses and research 
publications.55 About 3,500 new plant varieties 
have been evaluated for resilience to stresses.56 
A global information system on plant genetic 
resources is also being constructed, and is expected 
to become a major resource for agricultural 
research data available on an open-access basis.57
Notwithstanding these accomplishments under 
the treaty, or perhaps because of its very success, 
there was a perceived need to solidify its legal 
foundations with respect to two underlying 
concerns. First, given that the CBD, as drafted 
in 1992, had contemplated only a state-to-state 
bilateral regime of ABS, was the establishment of 
a multilateral regime for facilitated access to plant 
genetic resources legally consistent with the CBD? 
Moreover, if the ITPGRFA and the CBD could be 
rendered legally compatible in theory, the bigger 
concern was their compatibility in practice. More to 
the point, how were pending proposals concerning 
51 Eight CGIAR-affiliated IARCs, with a total of nearly 700,000 ex situ 
accessions, were parties to this agreement. See Isabel López Noriega, 
Peterson Wambugu & Alejandro Mejías, “Assessment of progress to make 
the multilateral system functional: incentives and challenges at the country 
level” in Crop Genetic Resources, supra note 44, 199 at 205.
52 For details, see Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 
121–30 (citing authorities).
53 Interview of Shakheel Bhatti, former director general of the ITPGRFA (10 
October 2016).
54 Ibid; López Noriega, Wambugu & Mejías, supra note 51 at 205–6.
55 Communications provided by the Secretariat of the ITPGRFA to Duke 
University School of Law (2016) (on file with the author).
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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global enforcement of the CBD’s misappropriation 
regime at the national level to be reconciled with 
the very scientific and industrial uses of plant 
genetic resources that the crop commons aimed to 
promote? These and other related questions were 
specifically addressed in the Nagoya Protocol to the 
CBD of 2010, which entered into force in 2014.58
General Enforcement Measures 
under the Nagoya Protocol
Articles 3, 12 and 16 of the Nagoya Protocol 
expressly apply compliance measures to both the 
genetic resources within the scope of the CBD and 
the associated traditional knowledge.59 Besides 
derivatives (broadly construed) and stand-alone 
biochemical components of genetic resources, 
ABS obligations under the CBD arguably cover 
related data, know-how and other relevant 
information pertaining to research on genetic 
resources “up to their commercialization.”60 
This conclusion follows in part because the 
legislative history appears to include “sequencing 
genes and genomes” within the definition of 
“utilization of genetic resources” in article 2(c).61
Given this broad subject matter coverage, a primary 
objective of the Nagoya Protocol was to oblige 
signatory states to adopt compliance measures 
that would make the CBD’s ABS requirements 
enforceable at the local level, ideally in courts or 
through other administrative processes.62 In this 
context, access to traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources was given explicit 
consideration, including detailed compliance 
obligations to be implemented in domestic 
58 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28.
59 Ibid, arts 1–3, 16. For broad definitions of “utilization of genetic 
resources,” “biotechnology” and “derivatives,” all covered by the CBD, 
see especially article 2.
60 See e.g. Gurdial Singh Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit 
Sharing of Genetic Resources: Analysis and Implementation Options for 
Developing Countries (Research Paper No 36) (Geneva: South Centre, 
2011) at 35.
61 See UNEP, Report of the Meeting of the Group of Legal and Technical 
Experts on Concepts, Terms, Working Definitions, and Sectoral Approaches, 
UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/2 (2008). See also Laird & Wynberg, 
supra note 34.
62 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, arts 6–7, 12–16.
legislation.63 Transboundary cooperation with 
respect to compliance is expressly required.64
The Nagoya Protocol does not prescribe any 
uniform compliance text that member states 
must adopt in this regard.65 However, the protocol 
does encourage member states to develop model 
contractual clauses for mutually agreed terms.66 
It also requires states to establish national 
checkpoints and focal points for purposes of 
compliance, and to share relevant information 
via a platform — the ABS Clearing-House — to be 
established under the protocol.67 Also envisioned 
are internationally recognizable certificates of 
compliance to facilitate legitimate cross-border 
transactions and to impede transgressors.68 
Implicit in all these obligations is the risk 
that non-compliant goods may be treated as 
contraband and seized by national border agents. 
In other words, here the developing countries 
promoting the Nagoya Protocol have applied 
lessons drawn from articles 41–61 of the TRIPS 
Agreement of 1994, which first introduced strong 
enforcement measures into international IP 
law.69 To be sure, under the TRIPS Agreement, 
members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) must establish border controls and other 
measures to block or seize counterfeit knowledge 
goods.70 The Nagoya Protocol, instead, imposes 
duties of transborder cooperation to enforce ABS 
obligations on all member states,71 along with the 
previously mentioned national checkpoints and 
focal points.72 Taken together, these and other 
compliance measures could lead to a globalized 
enforcement regime under the CBD that would 
resemble that of TRIPS in many respects. 
63 See ibid, arts 7, 12, 16. According to Gurdial Singh Nijar, “nothing 
in the Protocol allows for access to publicly available TK [traditional 
knowledge] or TK that is diffused and has no identifiable holders (and 
that is consequently held by the State) without PIC and MAT.” See Nijar, 
supra note 60 at 36.
64 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 11.
65 Ibid, arts 15–16.
66 Ibid, art 19.
67 Ibid, arts 6, 13, 15–16, 17(2).
68 Ibid, arts 6–7, 17(3).
69 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, arts 41–61.
70 See ibid, arts 51–60.
71 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, arts 11, 14–18.
72 See ibid, art 13.
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As matters stand, non-compliant goods emanating 
even from the few states not subscribing to 
the CBD — notably the United States — will be 
subject to any and all of the compliance measures 
to be implemented under the Nagoya Protocol. 
By the same token, products emanating from 
the United States can presumably benefit from 
certificates to be recognized by the ABS Clearing-
House, which should facilitate transit across 
national checkpoints so long as compliance with 
ABS obligations is properly documented.73
Measures Favouring 
Scientific Research 
Unlike the CBD as initially drafted in 1992, 
the Nagoya Protocol expressly recognizes the 
importance of scientific research as a supplier 
of both monetary and non-monetary benefits to 
the developing country members of the CBD.74 
The protocol then drives this point home by 
expressly validating the multilateral regime 
of facilitated access to plant genetic resources 
that the ITPGRFA established in 2001.75 To the 
same end, the protocol bestows anticipatory 
recognition on other multilateral regimes of 
facilitated access to ex situ genetic resources that 
may similarly promote scientific research in the 
future, if they simultaneously ensure that benefits 
from downstream commercial applications 
will be shared with the relevant providers.76
73 See ibid, arts 11, 14–18.
74 See ibid, arts 5(4), 8(a), 9 (promoting research). See also Evanson Chege 
Kamau, Bevis Fedder & Gerd Winter, The Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing: What Is New and What Are the 
Implications for Provider and User Countries and the Scientific Community? 
(2011) 6:3 L, Environment & Development J 246 at 256 (envisioning future 
work on issues of scientific research), online: <www.lead-journal.org/
content/10246.pdf>.
75 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, arts 4(1), 4(4). The preamble 
to the Nagoya Protocol also expressly acknowledges the fundamental 
role of the ITPGRFA “for achieving food security worldwide and for 
sustainable development of agriculture…and climate change,” and for the 
multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing to be established under 
the treaty.
76 Ibid, arts 4(2), 4(4). The preamble also expressly acknowledges the 
importance of the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) efforts to 
ensure “access to human pathogens for public health preparedness and 
response purposes.” These efforts culminated in the WHO’s Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework Agreement (2011). See 
WHO, Pandemic influenza preparedness Framework for the sharing 
of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, World 
Health Assembly, Res WHA645 (24 May 2011), online: <www.who.int/
influenza/resources/pip_framework/en/>. For basic concepts of the PIP 
Framework and its lessons for analogous pooling arrangements in the 
future, see Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 233–49.
To enforce this proviso as an outer limit on 
scientific research, article 8(a) of the protocol 
requires providers of ex situ genetic resources for 
non-commercial research purposes to insert a 
“change of intent” clause in every relevant SMTA.77 
Such a clause would impose benefit-sharing 
obligations on scientists whose research uses did in 
fact lead to downstream commercial applications. 
Scientific researchers must accordingly oblige 
end-users to respect these benefit-sharing 
commitments as part of any commercial 
value chain resulting from relevant SMTAs.
For genetic resources emanating from established 
multilateral regimes, such as the FAO’s ITPGRFA 
or the WHO’s PIP Framework, a built-in take-and-
pay rule (that is, a liability rule) would presumably 
satisfy the Nagoya Protocol.78 SMTAs issued 
by the CGIAR’s seed banks, for example, can 
contractually impose benefit-sharing obligations on 
new commercial uses of plant cultivars obtained 
before the adoption of the CBD in 1993.79 Similarly, 
when the country of origin remains uncertain 
or controversial, SMTAs can obligate end-users 
who commercialize plant cultivars from the crop 
commons to fulfil their ABS obligations by paying a 
share of gross revenues into a benefit-sharing fund 
established under the ITPGRFA for this purpose.80 
The Nagoya Protocol would similarly establish the 
Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism 
for the payment of ABS obligations by end-
users whenever the true provider country of the 
resources in question cannot be identified.81 Even 
then, however, serious questions may arise about 
the coverage of related traditional knowledge 
77 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 8(a). See further Kamau, Fedder & 
Winter, supra note 74 at 258–59.
78 See above notes 42–46 and accompanying text. For a detailed analysis 
of the take-and-pay regime (technically a “liability rule” and not an 
“exclusive property right”) as embodied in the ITPGRFA, see Reichman, 
Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 118–42 (analyzing both 
strengths and weaknesses of the regime).
79 SMTAs can thus cure the legal ambiguity concerning the applicability of the 
CBD to pre-1993 ex situ genetic resources and related traditional knowledge. 
See e.g. Nijar, supra note 60 at 34, concerning “Temporal scope.”
80 See ITPGRFA, supra note 40, arts 13, 16(d)(ii). For the relevant SMTA, 
see FAO Conference, supra note 48, arts 2, 6, 7 & 8. See generally 
Michael Halewood, “International Efforts to Pool and Conserve Crop 
Genetic Resources in Times of Radical Legal Change” in Mario Cimoli 
et al, eds, Intellectual Property Rights: Legal and Economic Challenges 
for Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 288. See 
generally Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 125–30 
(“Notification, Benefit-Sharing and the SMTA” under ITPGRFA).
81 See e.g. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 10 (“Global Multilateral 
Benefit-Sharing Mechanism”).
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under these provisions or related SMTAs, in the 
absence of any multilateral agreements regulating 
traditional knowledge already known beyond the 
sphere of any given Indigenous community.82
Resolving these and other ABS issues, then, 
becomes considerably more complicated when 
providers of ex situ genetic resources do not 
operate within the legal constraints imposed 
by any international instrument consistent 
with article 4 of the Nagoya Protocol.83 This 
topic is discussed in the next section.
The Implications for 
Science Policy
If the Nagoya Protocol has firmly established 
the legitimacy of the crop commons in public 
international law, it has simultaneously raised 
new and potentially disruptive questions 
concerning the operations of the pre-existing 
microbial research commons under the aegis of 
the WFCC.84 So far, the typical response of the 
culture collections has been to cast themselves as 
“trusted intermediaries” whose operations position 
them midway between providers of non-monetary 
research benefits and those that incur benefit-
sharing obligations under the protocol.85 To this 
end, SMTAs authorize the use of ex situ microbial 
specimens for most research purposes, while 
imposing contractual obligations to share benefits 
with provider countries under viral licences that 
cover commercial applications of research results.86
82 See above note 63 and accompanying text.
83 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 4; see also above notes  
74–76 and accompanying text.
84 See above notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
85 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, arts 4–5, 8, 15–16; see above 
notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
86 See e.g. Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 214–19  
(“The Core MTA of the European Union Culture Collections’ Organization”); 
see also ibid at 528–38 (“The Global Biological Resource Centers Network 
[GBRCN] Demonstration Project”); ibid at 541–43 (“The Next Step: The 
Microbial Resource Infrastructure (MIRRI) as a European Stepping Stone to 
the GBRCN”). See generally David Smith & Philippe Desmeth, Access and 
Benefit Sharing: A Main Preoccupation of the World Federation for Culture 
Collections (WFCC) (2007), online: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/media/57a08be9e5274a27b2000e55/CBD-2007-Smith-Desmeth.pdf>.
In this same vein, the European Union’s Regulation 
on Access to and Use of Genetic Resources, 
adopted in 2014 (Regulation 511/2014),87 seeks to 
ensure that ex situ culture collections operating 
under national laws will effectively comply with 
the ABS obligations of the Nagoya Protocol.88 
This carefully drafted regulation covers all the 
compliance obligations of the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol. It obliges all users to exercise 
due diligence in ascertaining that the genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge 
they rely on were accessed in accordance with 
applicable legal requirements and to ensure that 
any resulting commercial benefits are shared 
with providers as required.89 With specific regard 
to ex situ resources, Regulation 511/2014 seeks 
to establish a “register of collections,” whose 
operations are to be certified as consistent with 
international legal obligations and with the duty of 
due diligence imposed under the regulation itself.90 
EU member states must verify that each 
collection submitted for inclusion in the register 
of trusted intermediaries meets the monitoring 
and record-keeping obligations it otherwise 
mandates.91 All such information bearing on 
due diligence will be shared with the ABS 
Clearing-House being established under article 
14(1) of the Nagoya Protocol and with national 
authorities operating under the protocol.92 
From a broader perspective, the preamble to 
Regulation 511/2014 expressly recognizes that 
the “collection of genetic resources in the wild 
is mostly undertaken for non-commercial 
purposes by academic, university and non-
commercial researchers or collectors.”93 With 
that in mind, the commendable objective 
87 EU Regulation 511/2014, supra note 38..
88 See e.g. Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 219–225.
89 EU Regulation 511/2014, supra note 38, Preamble & arts 3–5, 21.
90 See ibid, arts 4–5.
91 See ibid, art 5(3). See also Kate Davis, Eliana Fontes & Luciane Marinoni, 
“Ex situ collections and the Nagoya Protocol: A briefing on the exchange 
of specimens between European and Brazilian ex situ collections, and the 
state of the art of relevant ABS practices” (Background paper prepared 
for the International Workshop on the role to be played by biological 
collections under the Nagoya Protocol, 6th EU/Brazil Sectoral Dialogue 
Support Facility, Brazil, 18–20 June 2013), online: <http://sectordialogues.
org/sites/default/files/acoes/documentos/background_paper.pdf>. 
92 See EU Regulation 511/2014, supra note 38, arts 6–7. See generally 
Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 221–25.
93 EU Regulation 511/2014, supra note 38, Preamble, s 27.
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of the regulation is to repress biopiracy.94 
Nonetheless, the legal foundations of the 
regulation remain open to question. 
Under a strict reading of the Nagoya Protocol, for 
example, there are arguably only two recognized 
legal routes for accessing genetic resources under 
the CBD, namely, the bilateral approach for case-
by-case acquisitions of in situ materials,95 and 
the multilateral regime for facilitated access 
to ex situ genetic resources now validated by 
article 4 of the protocol.96 Given this premise, one 
may ask whether the public microbial culture 
collections, in and of themselves, can fashion a 
sui generis legal status as trusted intermediaries 
for accessing and exchanging  ex situ microbial 
genetic resources. Their own SMTAs, however 
carefully constructed, would not seem to provide 
the kind of basic international legal instrument 
envisioned by article 4 of the Nagoya Protocol.97
The European Union’s Regulation 511/2014 could, 
of course, provide a basic international instrument 
for its own member states as required under 
article 4 of the protocol.98 But does Regulation 
511/2014 suffice to create the kind of multilateral 
regime envisioned by article 4(4)? Neither the 
Nagoya Protocol nor the CBD expressly recognizes 
the status of “trusted intermediaries,” falling 
somewhere in between case-by-case negotiations 
under the bilateral approach or the take-and-pay 
rules embodied in the ITPGRFA, which do fulfill 
the ABS obligations of the CBD. In other words, is 
there room under article 4 of the Nagoya Protocol 
for the kind of contractually constructed access 
regime envisioned by Regulation 511/2014, based 
on the concept of due diligence by “trusted 
intermediaries”? Or does such a concept fall outside 
of the safe harbour established by that same article? 
And even if Regulation 511/2014 can somehow be 
reconciled with the Nagoya Protocol’s safe harbour, 
what about all of the WFCC’s important microbial 
94 Ibid, ss 3, 6, 9, 10.
95 See above notes 15–25 and accompanying text.
96 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 4(4) (legitimizing “specialized 
international access and benefit-sharing instrument[s]…consistent with…
the objectives of the Convention and this Protocol” that may arise in the 
future). See further Godt, supra note 1 at 258.
97 See above notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
98 See above notes 75–83 and accompanying text.
culture collections operating outside of the 
territorial jurisdiction of that same instrument?99
A safer and better approach would seem to require 
the WFCC to reorganize itself as an international 
entity that governs a multilateral regime of 
facilitated access to ex situ microbial genetic 
resources and related traditional knowledge. 
In so doing, it need not copy the rather clumsy 
governance model adopted for the ITPGRFA, 
whose defects have elicited a growing literature.100 
On the contrary, there are now a number of 
organizational models for pooling scientific inputs 
and outputs that are far more flexible and more 
science-friendly than the top-down administrative 
structures supporting the crop commons.101
Envisioning a Multilateral 
Regime of Facilitated 
Access to Ex Situ Microbial 
Genetic Resources
Once the WFCC’s microbial culture collections 
folded themselves into a multilateral format 
with built-in benefit-sharing arrangements, their 
public culture collections — like the CGIAR’s 
seed banks102 — would immediately acquire a 
recognized, preferential status under article 4 of the 
Nagoya Protocol.103 As a result, national courts and 
administrators enforcing ABS obligations under the 
Nagoya Protocol to the CBD should recognize and 
validate SMTAs emanating from the corresponding 
99 For the geographical scope of the WFCC’s microbial culture collections, 
see generally Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 4 
(“The Existing Microbial Research Commons Confronts Proprietary 
Obstacles”) at 167–99 (citing authorities).
100 See e.g. ibid at 130–42 (“Strengths and Weaknesses of the ITPGRFA”).
101 See generally ibid, ch 9 (“Institutional Models for a Transnational Research 
Commons”); see also ibid, ch 10 at 579–650 (describing a proposed new 
governance model for a redesigned microbial research commons).
102 ITPGRFA, supra note 40. See also above notes 43–46 and accompanying 
text.
103 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 4(1).
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multilateral regime as both enforceable and 
sufficient to comply with these obligations.104
The formation of a multilateral regime would further 
provide the public microbial culture collections 
with a governance structure to address ongoing 
problems for which both science and industry 
need timely answers.105 For example, under the 
European Union’s Regulation 511/2014,106 questions 
have resurfaced about the temporal scope of liability 
under the CBD, with particular regard to new uses 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
that were acquired before the Nagoya Protocol 
to the CBD took effect in 2014. Provider countries 
in their domestic laws generally insist that new 
uses of older genetic resources do require ABS 
agreements, while the European Union’s regulation 
exempts such uses on weak legal grounds.107
The European Union’s Regulation 511/2014 on 
genetic resources in public collections also limits 
recognition of any “associated” traditional knowledge 
that could trigger benefit-sharing obligations to 
express commitments specified in any contractual 
agreements between the parties that deal with 
these obligations.108 This approach attempts to 
prevent provider governments from claiming 
that other related traditional knowledge beyond 
that specified in any given SMTA between public 
collections and users was actually and wrongfully 
misappropriated. By the same token, the regulation 
does not require due diligence with regard to uses of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge in the 
case of products developed outside the territorial 
boundaries of the European Union and then 
imported into that territory.109 All of these positions 
are open to question under the Nagoya Protocol.110
Looking beyond the European Union’s Regulation 
511/2014, the criteria for legitimate access to 
traditional knowledge have generally been tightened 
under the Nagoya Protocol. For example, where local 
104 Ibid, arts 4(2)–4(4); ITPGRFA, supra note 40. See also above notes 
42–50 and accompanying text (ABS under the ITPGRFA).
105 For a survey of different governance models, see supra note 101.
106 See supra notes 67–99 and accompanying text.
107 See e.g. Barbara Lassen et al, The two worlds of Nagoya — ABS 
legislation in the EU and provider countries: discrepancies and how to 
deal with them (Zurich & Cape Town: Public Eye & Natural Justice, 2016) 
at 7–12. See also Kamau, Fedder & Winter, supra note 74 at 255.
108 See Lassen et al, supra note 107 at 13–14.
109 Ibid at 15–16.
110 Ibid.
communities have obtained the right to grant access 
to traditional knowledge, would-be users must obtain 
PIC and otherwise comply with the communities’ 
own ABS conditions.111 Signatories to the treaty 
should inform users of traditional knowledge 
about their obligations under the CBD,112 and local 
communities should be encouraged to codify these 
MAT and ABS obligations in protocols and model 
contractual clauses available to the public.113
While these and other provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol could seriously complicate microbiological 
research, WFCC culture collections adhering to a 
memorandum of understanding that established 
a multilateral regime of facilitated access to ex situ 
microbial genetic resources could directly address 
them through a suitably devised governing body.114 
The governing body would, in turn, presumably have 
the capacity to deal with such issues by agreement 
of the member governments duly appointed to that 
body for such purposes.115 The governing body of such 
a “microbial research commons” could thus resolve 
these and other issues for purposes of enabling 
facilitated exchanges of ex situ materials held by the 
member collections, even though the Conference 
of the Parties to the CBD had not yet fully resolved 
relevant uncertainties in pre-existing international 
law.116 In the long run, empirical evidence arising from 
decisions along these lines by the governing bodies 
of both the crop commons and a microbial research 
commons could support better-informed decisions 
by the Conference of the Parties to the CBD itself.
A redesigned microbial research commons should, 
moreover, strive to avoid some of the weaknesses of 
the crop commons that lurked beneath its otherwise 
ambitious and idealistic framework principles.117 For 
example, the SMTAs implementing a multilateral 
microbial research commons should contain a built-
111 See Kamau, Fedder & Winter, supra note 74 at 252, citing Nagoya 
Protocol, supra note 28, arts 5.2, 5.5, 6.2(f), 7.
112 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 12.2.
113 Ibid, arts 12.1, 12.3. See further Kamau, Fedder & Winter, supra note 74 
at 252 (also stressing the need for capacity building under the Nagoya 
Protocol, article 22).
114 Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 9 at 494–543.
115 Ibid at 526–41 (discussing the GBRCN Demonstration Project, for an 
empirical test of such a regime).
116 See e.g. Kamau, Fedder & Winter, supra note 74 at 256 (emphasizing 
uncertainties regarding basic research under articles 5.2 and 6.3. of the 
Nagoya Protocol still to be worked out by the drafters of model ABS 
agreements).
117 See above notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
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in research exemption, together with mandatory 
take-and-pay benefit-sharing obligations applicable 
in all cases. In other words, users should be free 
to undertake any research, whether scientific or 
applied, coupled with an absolute duty to pay 
a compensatory royalty on any downstream 
commercial applications to help support the costs 
of the commons and to fund scientific research on 
microbial genetic resources, especially in provider 
countries.118 A small user’s access fee could also be 
charged for similar purposes. Needless to say, the 
tracking system for scientific uses of microbes — a 
long-standing feature of microbiological research119 
— should be retained and further perfected, in 
order to avoid problems arising from the lack of any 
tracking mechanisms for plant cultivars obtained 
from the crop commons.120 The World Data Centre 
for Microorganisms (WDCM) should also be fully 
integrated into the proposed multilateral regime.121
Above all, the organizers of a redesigned microbial 
research commons should not imitate the rigid 
governance structure of the crop commons122 but 
instead devise and adopt a more science-driven 
governance apparatus, in which scientists as 
delegates would have a legally protected voice 
and voting role, alongside government officials.123 
To this end, the strengths and weaknesses of a 
number of existing science commons initiatives 
launched in the past few years should be empirically 
evaluated,124 in order to design an innovative, 
more science-friendly governance structure that 
breaks with the tendency of existing models to 
imitate the bureaucratic administrative models 
of many intergovernmental organizations.125
118 For detailed proposals to this effect, see Reichman, Uhlir & 
Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 5, at 260–90 (“Designing a Third 
Option: Ex Ante ‘Take and Pay’ Rules for Stimulating Research and 
Applications”). For related governance considerations, see ibid, ch 10, at 
598–636 (“Implementing the Multilateral Regime for Facilitated Access to 
Ex Situ Microbial Genetic Resources”). 
119 Ibid at 173–74 (unique strain identifiers in WFCC standard practice).
120 See above notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
121 See Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, 426–29, 624–28 
(discussing WDCM).
122 Ibid at 495–504 (“The Global Crop Commons: A Treaty-Based 
Intergovernmental Entity”).
123 Ibid, ch 10, at 579–98 (“Organizational and Structural Considerations”).
124 Ibid, ch 9, at 494–544 (“Selected Empirically Relevant Governance 
Approaches”).
125 Ibid at 544–67 (“In Search of a Politically Acceptable and Scientifically 
Productive Operational Framework”).
In sum, a pressing need for the WFCC to reorganize 
its existing microbial research commons in 
order to comply effectively and efficiently with 
the ABS obligations of the Nagoya Protocol to 
the CBD also creates an opportunity to devise a 
new, more enlightened governance regime that 
could become a model on which future science 
commons could build.126 Moreover, a multilateral 
regime of public microbial culture collections, once 
properly installed, could strive to support and link 
up with other relevant commons initiatives, such 
as the COMPARE Project on infectious diseases 
underway in the European Union127 and WHO’s 
PIP Framework,128 in a comprehensive knowledge 
commons supported by the superb digital 
framework already embodied in the WDCM.129 
A multilateral regime of public microbial culture 
collections, if properly organized into a true 
knowledge commons, could thus yield scientific 
payoffs well beyond the needed compliance with 
the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD. By providing 
scientifically validated genetic resources, traditional 
knowledge and related data for research and 
applications in compliance with international law 
from a central portal, it could become a crucial 
component of the global scientific infrastructure. 
In turn, that infrastructure should generate more 
and better research inputs and outputs across 
scientific disciplines. In other words, a properly 
redesigned microbial research commons should 
help to forge a pathway to enable scientists 
everywhere to overcome the legal and institutional 
barriers that might otherwise stand in the way 
of the New Biology paradigm put forward by the 
US National Academies in 2009.130 That paradigm, 
indeed, was a primary inspiration for undertaking 
the entire project on which this paper is based.
126 See e.g. Brett M Frischmann, Michael J Madison & Katherine J Strandburg, 
eds, Governing Knowledge Commons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions 
for Collective Action (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
127 See Collaborative Management Platform for Detection and Analysis of 
(Re-)emerging and Foodborne Outbreaks in Europe (COMPARE), News 
item, “Pilot project on Machine Learning and Antimicrobial Resistance” 
(25 September 2017), online: <www.compare-europe.eu/news/2017/09/
pilot-project-on-machine-learning-and-antimicrobial-resistance?id=45fed1d2-
3bfb-4ab7-ad6e-3a17e512baa4>. 
128 See PIP Framework, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
129 See the text accompanying note 121.
130 See National Research Council, supra note 1. See further Reichman, Uhlir 
& Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 19–36.
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